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I review empirical research into the economic impact of copyright law.  A key difficulty is 
that there is little systematic measurement of creative output and copying: there are only 
fragmentary statistics for the various industries.  Studies of U.S. copyright registrations 
provide conflicting results: one shows that small changes in fees have large impacts on 
renewals, while another shows that many movies and books have long lives.  All but one 
studies find that music piracy – whether conventional or digital – has hurt legitimate CD 
sales.   Studies of extensions of copyright duration yield conflicting results: one focusing on 
U.S. registrations finds no effect, while a multi-country study finds that extensions are 
associated with substantial increases in movie production.   I conclude with directions for 
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1. Introduction 
Copyright law involves a fundamental trade-off between incentives for creators of new work 
against the benefits from use of existing work for final consumption and as inputs into 
further creative activity. 
“Copyright protection … trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the 
benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place.  Striking the correct 
balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.” (Landes 
and Posner 1989).   
In this trade-off, the “access” to existing work includes use by consumers as well as 
use by creators of derivative or incremental works.  Both research and development and 
creative activity may be cumulative in the sense that they build on earlier discoveries and 
creations. 
In assessing the trade-off, it is important to consider that copyright law provides 
protection on three dimensions (Watt 2004): (i) duration – the length of time for which 
copyright is in force; (ii) depth – which aspects of the creation are protected (generally, 
copyright law protects the expression but not the idea); and (iii) breadth – the limits of “fair 
use”, the rights to derivative works, and limits on rental and re-sale.   It is also important to 
consider the costs of tracing and transacting with the copyright owner (Landes and Posner 
1989). 
There has been a substantial volume of theoretical research into copyright.  This has 
pointed to many empirical issues surrounding the fundamental trade-off.
1  However, there 
has been relatively little empirical research, hence major questions remain open.  
o  “In the formation of copyright policy, the lack of empirical data and the inability to 
quantify important variables … preclude precise evaluation of the impact of any 
significant changes in the degree of copyright protection” (Bard and Kurlantzick 
(1999) page 3). 
o  “Perhaps the most pressing area in which the economics of copyright is lacking is in 
serious empirical studies” (Watt 2004). 
In this review, I shall first discuss the barriers to empirical research, then the results 
of the limited empirical research so far published, and finally, directions for future work.  
The discussion is organized around three issues: 
(i)  How to measure creative output and copying; 
                                            
1  For research into copyright in general, see Landes and Posner (2003), Watt (2004), Varian (2006).  
See also Boldrin and Levine (2002), Legros (2005), and Liebowitz and Watt (2006). Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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(ii) How do changes in copyright law (duration, depth, and breadth) affect the expected 
earnings of creators of new work? 
(iii)What is the creators’ elasticity of supply of new work? 
 
2.  Measurement 
The first issue is very basic, viz., the availability of the relevant data, and in particular, data 
regarding the creation of copyrightable items.  The limited availability of such information 
may well be the single most important reason for the dearth of empirical research into 
copyright. 
The “production” of a copyrightable item has two dimensions – one is the number of 
different titles, while the other is the volume of each title.  The distinction between the two 
dimensions is important for two reasons.  One, production of copyrightable items is subject 
to a high “first copy cost” relative to the marginal cost of subsequent units.  Two, consumers 
value variety – another copy of the same movie seldom provides as much benefit as a 
different title.  To avoid confusion, I shall use the terms “creation”, “publication”, and 
“creative activity” rather than “production”. 
A subtler issue is that creative activity itself has two dimensions – one is the number 
of titles, and the other is the quality of each title.  Generally, there is no data on the quality 
of creative activity, so I shall focus on the data available for the number of titles. 
Books.   The International Publishers Association (IPA) provides annual statistics on titles 
published in various countries from 1990-1999.   The IPA provides complete coverage for 
only 13 countries, viz., Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.  The IPA obtained the data 
from its national member organizations. 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
provides statistics on titles published for a broader set of countries (Canada, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Iran, Italy, 
Lithuania, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, Macedonia, and Turkey), but for a shorter time period, 1995-1999. The 
UNESCO website does not disclose the primary sources of the data. 
The coverage of the IPA and UNESCO statistics overlap for five countries – 
Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, and Switzerland.   For these five countries, the Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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correlation between the IPA and UNESCO numbers over the period 1995-1999 ranged from 
– 57% (Norway) to 99.5% (Hungary), with an average of 32%.
2 
Recorded Music.  The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) provides 
annual statistics of aggregate sales of recorded music (both unit volume and monetary value) 
for 70 countries.  However, IFPI does not report information on the number of titles.  The 
IFPI information is provided by its national member organizations.  Accordingly, the 
coverage of the IFPI statistics depends on the degree to which the various national member 
organizations provide representative information.  For instance, in the case of the United 
States, “data is collected from RIAA [Recording Industry Association of America] member 
companies that distribute approximately 84% of the prerecorded music” (RIAA 2006). 
 
Motion pictures.  There are two sources of information about movie creation.  One is the 
Internet Movie Database (IMBb), sponsored by Amazon.com, which proclaims itself to be 
“Earth’s biggest movie database”.  The other is the Film Index International, published by 
the British Film Institute. 
The IMDb encompasses various categories of audio-visual work, including movies, 
shorts, TV movies, TV series, and videos.  IMDb records vary in detail.  Most of the 
information in the IMDb is volunteered by industry members and website visitors.   
  The Film Index International provides information only about movies.  The 
correlation in the number of movies created across a panel of OECD countries in the Film 
Index International and IMDb was 93% (Png and Wang 2006). 
Electronic games. The Entertainment Software Association represents publishers of video 
and computer games that account for more than 90% of the U.S. entertainment software 
market.  It provides annual statistics of aggregate sales of video and computer games (both 
unit volume and monetary value) for the United States only.  However, ESA does not report 
information on the number of titles.  The data is provided by NPD, a commercial 
information vendor.   
The United Kingdom is the world’s third largest market for video and computer 
games after the United States and Japan.  The Entertainment & Leisure Software Publishers 
Association (ELSPA) provides annual statistics for the United Kingdom. 
                                            
2 The International Standard Book Number (ISBN) uniquely identifies every book, but does not 
provide information about number of titles created (ISBN.org 2006).  Specifically, the ISBN is a 10-
digit number, comprising four parts of variable length, viz., country or region identifier, publisher 
identifier, title identifier, and a check digit.  Each publisher acquires ISBNs from the national ISBN 
agency in blocks, and uses the numbers in running sequence until exhausted and then applies for a 
fresh allocation.  There is no correspondence between ISBN and year of publication. Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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Software.  So far as I am aware, there are no publicly available statistics on the creation of 
software.  Indeed, it may well be futile to compile such statistics.  The reason is that 
software differs essentially from the other categories of copyrightable items.  First, software 
is much more heterogeneous – ranging from enterprise systems for thousands of concurrent 
users to simple single-user online programs.  Second, there is relatively more emphasis on 
new versions of existing titles (eg, Windows, 2.0, 3.0, 98, 2000, ME, XP, etc.) than creation 
of completely new titles.  Moreover, as software is continually “fixed”, it is difficult to 
identify what counts as a new version.   
Based on the preceding review, I conclude that what is most urgently needed is 
accurate statistics of the creation of three categories of copyrightable items – books, 
recorded music, and electronic games – across countries in recent years.  Unfortunately, 
despite its importance, such work is relatively unglamorous.  The best hope is that the 
relevant industry associations and possibly international organizations such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) can be persuaded to collect and publish these 
statistics. 
As with creative activity generally, empirical research into copying depends on 
reliable measures.  By contrast with measurement of the creative activity itself, there is 
much more public attention to measurement of piracy.  (For the purposes of this review, any 
unauthorized copying is considered to be “piracy”.)  Most prominently, the BSA publishes 
an annual report on piracy of business software with statistics for 97 countries and territories, 
and the IFPI publishes an annual report on piracy of recorded music with statistics for 73 
countries and territories. 
Owing to the public policy interest, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have 
initiated projects to develop methodologies for measurement of piracy (Olsen 2005).  The 
WIPO project focuses on measurement of copyright piracy (Hui and Png 2005). Hopefully, 
these efforts will yield internationally-accepted methodologies, that various countries will 
implement and so produce reliable national statistics on piracy. 
 
3.  Expected Earnings 
Plant (1934) observed that, for most of the 19
th century, U.S. copyright law did not provide 
any protection to British authors, yet British authors received substantial income from U.S. 
publishers.  Remarkably, following Plant’s (1934) seminal contribution, almost 70 years 
elapsed before any further research into the impact of copyright on creators’ earnings.   Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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Under U.S. law, registration of copyright is not mandatory.  However, the law 
provides an incentive for registration, as the owner must register (or, under the 1976 
Copyright Act, apply to register) before the infringement (or within three months of first 
publication) if the owner seeks statutory damages and attorney fees.   
A historical study of registrations with the U.S. Copyright Office provides evidence 
that the expected value of copyright protection is very low (Landes and Posner 2003).  
During the period 1910-2000, the registration fee increased several times.  Although the fee 
was quite low (an average of $20.48 in 2000 dollars over the period), the demand for 
registrations was price sensitive.  Specifically, the elasticity of registrations with respect to 
the fee ranged from –0.20 (± 0.93) to –0.24 (± 1.34).  This price sensitivity to even low 
registration fees suggests that the present value of the future earnings from the copyrighted 
item was quite small. 
Baker and Cunningham (2006) conducted an event study of changes in U.S. 
copyright law on the stock-market value of companies in copyright-related industries 
between 1986-98.
3  They considered both case and statutory law, and found that increases in 
copyright protection were associated with an average US$4 - 8.4 million increase in the 
market value of these companies.
4 
Note, however, that the increase in stock-market value tends to over-state the impact 
of legal changes on the earnings from a given set of creative activity.  The reason is that any 
increase in market value reflects the increased profit from existing creative work and future 
infra-marginal creations, as well as the increase in expected profit arising from marginal 
future creations stimulated by the increased copyright protection. 
Next, I review studies that focused on the impact of particular dimensions of 
copyright law on creators’ earnings. 
Duration.  Rappaport (1998) studied the commercial value in 1998 of movies first 
copyrighted in the period 1922-1941.  He found two trends.  First, more recently created 
movies were more likely to be still played commercially.  Specifically, the commercial 
survival rates were 11% among movies created in 1926-1928, 40% among movies created in 
1929-1932, and 65%, among movies created 1933-1941.  Second, more recently created 
movies were of relatively greater commercial value.   Specifically, the average commercial 
                                            
3  Specifically, the industries were SICs 27 (Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries), 73 (Business 
Services), and 78 (Motion Pictures). 
4  Khong and Khong (2006) conducted a similar study of U.K. companies, and found no significant 
effect. Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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value was $175,000 among movies created in 1926-1930, $250,000 among movies created 
in 1931-1934, and $400,000 among movies created in 1935-1941. 
Landes and Posner (2003) also studied the pattern of renewals of registration with 
the U.S. Copyright Office during the period 1910-91.  Until 1962, renewals were effective 
for an additional 28 years, while from 1962, the renewal was for 47 years. 
Generally, the renewal rate increased from a low of 3% in 1914 to a high of 22% in 
1991, and the renewal rate was highest for music, middling for books, and lowest for 
graphic-arts works.  Assuming that works were not renewed because the expected future 
earnings fell below the cost of renewal ($10 plus the time and effort), Landes and Posner 
(2003) concluded that almost 80% of copyrighted works had little economic value after the 
initial term.   
By contrast, (Liebowitz and Margolis 2005) studied a sample of 236 titles reviewed 
by Book Review Digest in the 1920s.  Fifty-eight years later, 41% were still in print. 
In assessing the value of copyright protection, it is important to note that, at the point 
in time where the creator incurs the cost of creative effort, she will not know whether her 
work will turn into a blockbuster.  Hence, copyright, copyright registration, and most 
importantly, renewal of copyright registration should be valued as real options rather than 
absolute amounts. 
Depth.   So far as I am aware, there has been no empirical research into the impact of 
changes in the depth of copyright protection on creator’s earnings.
5   
Breadth.  The overwhelming bulk of empirical research into copyright has focused on the 
impact of the breadth of copyright on creators’ earnings, and specifically, the impact of 
copying.   Illegal copying is also called “piracy”.  An issue of particular interest is the effect 
of advances in information and communications technology on copying and the creator’s 
earnings. 
In principle, copying could affect creators’ earnings positively or negatively.  
Positive effects include advertising, sampling, and sharing, all of which would stimulate 
                                            
5  In the case of Baker v. Selden (101 U.S. 99, 1879), Selden published a book describing a new 
book-keeping system which included sample forms.  Baker modified and sold the forms, and was 
held not to have infringed Selden’s copyright.  Landes and Posner (1989) explain that the court was 
correct to limit the depth of copyright protection, as there are limited ways to express the idea of the 
book-keeping system.  Allowing copyright over the forms (an expression) would have essentially 
provided copyright over the book-keeping system (the idea).  Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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demand for the legitimate item.  The obvious negative effect is the direct substitution of 
pirated for the legitimate item. 
A key innovation in the technology of copying was the photocopying machine.  How 
did that affect the earnings of creators?  Liebowitz (1985) observed that, following the 
widespread adoption of photocopying machines, journal publishers raised subscription rates 
to libraries relative to rates for individuals.  Further, the differential was highest for the most 
frequently copied journals.  By charging discriminatory rates, the publishers could 
“indirectly appropriate” some of the libraries’ benefit from copying.  
With regard to piracy, Hui and Png (2003) studied the experience in 28 countries 
between 1994-98.  The demand for music CDs decreased with piracy, suggesting that 
“theft” outweighed any positive effects of piracy.  Hui and Png (2003) calculated that, in 
1998, actual unit losses amounted to about 6.6% of sales.  The actual revenue loss would 
have been higher as publishers would have raised prices in the absence of piracy.
6  
A relatively recent innovation in the technology of copying is peer-to-peer online file 
sharing.  Owing in part to the landmark Napster and Grokster cases,
7 online file sharing 
triggered a veritable cottage industry of empirical research.   
The challenge has been to measure the extent of file-sharing and relate it to changes 
in the sales of music CDs, while taking account of any simultaneity in the relation.  Most 
researchers used various proxies for file-sharing, including the self-reported downloading of 
music (Peitz and Waelbroeck 2004; Zentner 2006), Internet and broadband penetration 
(Zentner 2005), Internet penetration (Hong 2004), and Internet usage (Liebowitz 2005).  By 
contrast, Rob and Waldfogel (2004) and Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2005) used direct 
information on downloading.   
While Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2005) found that file-sharing had no impact on 
music CD sales, all of the other studies concluded that file-sharing caused music CD sales to 
fall (Liebowitz 2006).
8  See the Table. 
-- Table about here -- 
                                            
6  A related question that has drawn substantial academic interest is what determines piracy.  The 
factors identified include culture (Husted 2000; Marron and Steel 2000), income (Marron and Steel 
2000; Rodriguez-Andres 2002), the size of the domestic software industry (Gopal and Sanders 1998), 
and judicial efficiency (Holm 2003). 
7  A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 
et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2005 respectively. 
8  Stevans and Sessions (2005) also found that file-sharing reduced CD sales, inferring this from a 
change in the trend of growth of music CD sales without any information on downloading. Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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Another aspect to the breadth of copyright protection is the extent to which the seller 
of a copyrighted item can control the buyer’s commercial use, and specifically, rental and 
re-sale.  In the United States, by the “first sale doctrine”, movie studios cannot restrict 
buyers of pre-recorded videotapes from renting to others.  Accordingly, studios have only 
two choices of pricing – uniform pricing, or indirect discrimination by initially pricing high 
to capture surplus from video rental stores and then cutting price for “sell through”.  In the 
European Union, however, studios can directly discriminate – charging stores different 
prices for videotapes for rental and for sell through.   
Mortimer (2005) estimated the retail demand for rental vis-a-vis sell through 
videotapes and DVDs, and calculated that direct discrimination would benefit studios and 
consumers at the expense of retailers in the case of DVDs, but not necessarily in the case of 
videotapes.  
 
4.  Elasticity of Supply   
Given how changes in copyright law affect the expected returns to creative activity, the next 
question is how creators respond to changes in earnings.  Equivalently, what is their 
elasticity of supply?   For a 1% increase in earnings, by how much would creators increase 
their effort, as measured by the number of titles and the quality of each title? 
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the Eldred case, which challenged the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).
 9  Seventeen distinguished economists, 
including five Nobel laureates, filed an amici curiae brief against the CTEA (Akerlof et al. 
2002).  Based on illustrative calculations, they concluded that, “The CTEA’s longer 
copyright for new works provides at most a very small additional incentive”.   
In a trenchant criticism, Liebowitz and Margolis (2005) argued that Akerlof et al. 
had skirted the central issue: “The present value of additional revenues to authors might be 
heavily discounted (and small), but this need not imply that the impact of these revenues on 
the creation of works is small ... The change in the number of new titles depends on the 
additional reward received by authors and on the elasticity of creation with respect to 
reward” (pp. 443, 445-446). 
So what is this elasticity?  Until 1891, U.S. copyright law did not provide any 
protection to foreign authors. Then, Congress passed the International Copyright Act, which 
extended copyright protection to foreign authors, and through reciprocal recognition, 
                                            
9  Eric Eldred et al., v. John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 01-618. Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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extended international copyright protection to U.S. authors.  However, the Act did not have 
a substantial impact on the number of full-time authors in the United States (Khan 2004).
10 
Png and Wang (2006) studied the impact of extensions of copyright duration on the 
creation of movies.  With retrospective effect from July 1995, the European Union extended 
the term of copyright over movies to 70 years following the death of the last among the 
principal director, the screenplay and dialogue authors, and the music composer to die.   The 
extension applied retroactively to any existing work with copyright still in force. 
In a sample of 18 countries, Png and Wang (2006) found that the extensions were 
associated with a 1.80% (± 1.77%) to 12.7% (± 5.82%) increase in movie production.  An 
especially compelling result was that the increase in production was higher in countries with 
lower rates of piracy.  The findings were robust to various specifications, including 
controlling for changes in government funding of movie production.  These results suggest 
that even small increases in creators’ earnings can induce substantial increases in movie 
production.   
Separately, Baker and Cunningham (2005) studied the impact of changes in 
copyright law (both statutory and case-law) on applications for copyright registration.  They 
found that increases in copyright protection were associated with a small positive effect on 
applications. 
In future work, it is important to drill deeper into the incentive effect of copyright 
law.  Specifically, how are increases in future earnings divided among the various parties to 
creation of new work, for instance, in the case of music, song-writer, performer, and 
recording studio, and what are the respective incentive effects on each of them?  Further, 
what is the link between creation of new work and registration of copyright? 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
I have reviewed various strands of empirical research into copyright law.  Clearly, much 
more work needs to be done.  Above, I have pointed to various directions for future work.  
Here, I will highlight three others. 
First, with regard to the fundamental trade-off of intellectual property, there has been 
no study at all of the “costs of limiting access to a work” (Landes and Posner 1989) – with 
                                            
10  Towse (2001) observed that that: “Estimates suggest artists’ elasticity of supply to arts work is 
high and so a relatively small financial reward … can have a greater than proportionate impact on 
creativity”.  From Australian data, Throsby (1996) found that A$1 (Australian dollar) of income 
from non-artistic activity displaced A$0.14 of creative income and A$0.36 of arts-related income.    Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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regard to both end-use and follow-on creation.  Newton (1675) famously declared, “If I have 
seen further [than certain other men] it is by standing upon the shoulders of giants”.  The 
same applies to the creation of movies, music, and software as well.   A key cost of 
copyright is the impediment to future creators. 
  Second, we need research into the costs of tracing, transactions, and enforcement 
involved in the administration of copyright.  The magnitude of these costs is crucial to the 
question of whether copyright should be for fixed term or indefinite (Landes and Posner 
2003).  In particular, it would be interesting to measure the contribution of collecting 
societies towards reducing the costs of copyright administration.  A study of U.K. copyright 
cases suggests that bigger companies are relatively more involved in copyright litigation 
(Mazeh and Rogers 2005).  However, is this because of fixed costs of copyright litigation or 
because bigger companies have more copyrights to enforce? 
Third, we need empirical research into the different impact of copyright law on the 
various categories of creative work.  For instance, Landes and Posner (1989) observe that 
the possible range of popular songs is more limited than of other creative work, and so, 
support stronger copyright protection for song-writers.  To support such differentiation in 
copyright law, it is necessary to have the appropriate empirical justification.  
  Forthcoming, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues. 
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Table: Peer-to-peer file sharing and music CD sales 
 Study  Period  Sales impact 
Hong (2004)  2000  U.S. –7.8% 
Liebowitz (2005)  1998-2003  U.S. cities: –3.2% 
Peitz and Waldbroeck (2004)  2000-01  Worldwide: –11% 
U.S.: –12% 
Rob and Waldfogel (2004)  2003/04  U.S. university students: 
–9% 
Zentner (2005)  1997/98-
2000/01 
56 countries: –6.6% 
Zentner (2006)  2001  7 European countries:  
–7.8%  
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2005)  Fall 2002  Not significant 
 